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Introduction
Over the last few decades models of contest have been used to study rent seeking (Nitzan, 1994) and conflict (Skaperdas and Garfinkel, 2006) by political economists, reward structure in firms (Rosen, 1986 , Prendergast, 1999 by labor economists, electoral competition (Snyder, 1989 ) and design of optimal voluntary contribution mechanisms by public economists (Kolmar and Wagener, 2005) , and individual and team sports (Szymanski, 2003) by sports economists. A contest is modeled as a non-cooperative game between multiple agents. Agents make irreversible investments, which can be effort, money, or any other valuable resource depending on the context, to increase their probability of winning the contest and obtaining a private prize. The key element of all models of contest is the Contest Success Function (CSF) which specifies the winning probabilities of the contestants.
In order to analyze contests it is important to take into account the heterogeneity that exists among the contestants for two main reasons. First, if agents differ in their contestrelevant inherent characteristics then two agents with the same actual investments can have different winning probabilities as they can still have different levels of effective investments (Clark and Riis, 1998) . One can think of the actual investment and the contestrelevant inherent characteristics of an agent as inputs that he combines using his technology to produce effective investments. The effective investments then determine the winning probabilities. Second, different agents might have different technologies of combining actual investments with their inherent characteristics to produce the effective investments.
The contest-relevant inherent characteristics of agents can be treated as parameters that influence the winning probabilities. Skaperdas (1996) axiomatizes several non-param etric classes of CSF's in which the winning probability of each contestant depends solely on the investments, and all agents are implicitly assumed to have the same level of contest-relevant inherent characteristics and the same technology to produce effective investments. Clark and Riis (1998) allow contestants to differ in their characteristics but not in their technologies of converting actual investments into effective investments.
In this paper we first provide an axiomatization of vector-parametric CSF's where the scalar parameter associated with a contestant reflects his contest-relevant inherent characteristics. In addition, our formulation allows agents to possess different technologies of converting actual investments into effective investments. The vector-parametric CSF's are relevant for analyzing unmediated contests wherein each contestant uses his own technology to combine his actual investment and inherent characteristics and produce the effective investment. Elections, rent seeking, wars, sports, and patent races are some of the many real world examples of unmediated contests.
We shall use the term mediated contests to describe those contests in which the technology for converting actual investments of contestants into effective investments is determined by the contest administrator, and the exact CSF is known to the contestants before they invest.
1 Kolmar and Wagener (2005) suggest to modify public good games such that the contributions by various agents are used by the public agency to finance the public good and a private prize. The administrator informs the agents about the exact specification of the CSF. But, which CSF should the agency employ to ensure that only agents with high marginal productivity in the production of the public good contribute?
They show that the noisy-CSF proposed by Amegashie (2006) , in which the probability with which a contributor wins the private prize depends on the vector of contributions and a scalar parameter that reflects noise, might be useful in achieving this objective. We provide an axiomatization for such scalar-parametric CSF's as well. The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion of the required axioms. Section 3 axiomatizes the two types of parametric CSF's. We show that the CSF axiomatized by Clark and Riis (1998) is a special case of the vector-parametric CSF, and all the CSF's axiomatized by Skaperdas are special cases of the scalar-parametric CSF.
Section 4 concludes. The appendix contains the proofs.
The Axioms
Let N represent the set of agents (1, 2, ..., i, ..., n) who are competing for a prize. Define the probability that agent-i wins the contest as
The function p i (x ; α) is the vector-parametric CSF. The non-negative choice variable x i ∈ + is the actual investment by agent-i. The strictly positive parameter α i ∈ ++ is a measure of all contest-relevant inherent characteristics of contestant i that affect the winning probabilities of all agents.
We shall refer to the contest involving all the N agents as the global contest; and any contest involving agents in M ⊆ N as a sub-contest. p 2 The axioms A1, A2, A3, and the first part of axiom A4 were introduced by Skaperdas (1996) .
[A1] Probability. p i (x ; α) ∈ [0, 1], ∀ i ∈ N, and i∈N p i (x ; α) = 1.
, ∀ i ∈ M, and ∀M ⊆ N.
[A4] Marginal Effects.
The axiom of probability requires that each agent's winning probability should lie between zero and one; and the winning probabilities of agents should sum to unity. For a given vector of investments x ∈ N + , consider the sub-contest among agents in M ⊆ N . Consistency requires the probability that i ∈ M wins this sub-contest (p M i (x ; α)) to be the same as the probability that i would have won the global contest among all the N agents, given that one of the agents in M wins it. Consistency does not, however, rule out the possibility that the winning probability of an agent in the sub-contest might depend on the investments and characteristics of agents in N \M . The axiom of Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA S ) is introduced to eliminate this possibility. We shall refer to axioms A1, A2, and A3 as the within axioms as they are stated for a given vector of α ∈ N ++ , and do not impose any restriction on the relationship between p i (x ; α) and
The axioms A4 and A5 are mixed axioms as they impose restrictions on the form of the CSF by considering variations in both the actual investments and the inherent characteristics of the contestants. The axiom of marginal effects prescribes that the winning probability of a contestant be non-decreasing in his own investment, and his contestrelevant inherent characteristics. Several CSF's that have been used to analyze contests suffer from a discontinuity when all agents invest zero resources (Corchon, 2000) . We wish to come up with continuous contest success functions and therefore we have introduced the axiom of continuity.
Theorem 1. The axioms A1 − A5 are satisfied if and only if
p i (x ; α) = f i (x i ; α i ) k∈N f k (x k ; α k ) , ∀ i ∈ N,(1)where f i (x i ; α i )
is a continuously differentiable strictly positive function with
Proof: In the Appendix.
We interpret the value of f i (x i ; α i ) as the level of effective investment by contestant-i.
The effective investment is the output determined by the levels of the two inputs (inherent characteristics, and the actual investment), and the technology of combining these inputs. The technology of producing effective investments (f i (·)) can differ across agents as reflected by the subscript i. The ratio of winning probabilities of any two agents is thus equal to the ratio of their effective investments (Cornes and Hartley, 2005) .
The winning probability of each agent can be expressed using n parametric functions, with the function corresponding to agent-i depending only on x i and α i . This suggests that each contestant produces his effective investment independently of the others.
the above expression will be continuous as it is a sum of continuous functions. However,
++ for any i, j ∈ N , then the winning probabilities will not be well defined in the sub-contest involving these two contestants at (x i ,x j ;α i ,α j ). The conditions on f i (x i ; α i ) given in Theorem 2 ensure that the winning probabilities will be well defined even if the actual investment by all agents is zero. It is difficult to imagine a contest during which no contestant makes an investment. Following Corchon (2000), we shall interpret p i (0 ; α) as the prior winning probabilities of the contestants.
It seems reasonable to suggest that different agents with different levels of inherent characteristics may have different ex-ante winning probabilities.
Axiomatization
Our aim is to come up with the general expression for parametric CSF's which will include most of the CSF's used by applied researchers as special cases. In particular, we will show that all the axiomatization results of Skaperdas (1996) can be obtained as special cases of a parametric family of CSF's with a scalar parameter. The CSF axiomatized by Clark and Riis (1998) will be shown to be a special case of the vector-parametric CSF's. Skaperdas (1996) considers contests in which only investments matter and proves that the only CSF satisfying the within axioms of probability, consistency, independence of irrelevant alternatives, marginal effects with respect to own investments, homogeneity of order zero with respect to investments (p i (λx) = p i (x)), and anonymity (
).
The axiom of anonymity, as used by Skaperdas (1996) , requires that the winning probabilities of two contestants that invest equally must be the same. His framework neither allows for differences in the inherent characteristics of agents, nor in the technology of producing effective investments.
Clark and Riis (1998) argue that the anonymity axiom is inappropriate in several contests as the winning probabilities depend not only on the investments but also on the personal characteristics of the contestants. They go on to prove that a CSF satisfies the within axioms of probability, marginal effects with respect to own investments, IIA CR , and homogeneity with respect to investments if and only if it is given by
Clark and Riis use within axioms. For example, their homogeneity axiom can be formally expressed as
which implies that if the investments of all agents change by the same multiplicative factor the winning probabilities remain unaltered even though different agents have different levels of inherent characteristics. 4 Another feature of their axiomatization is that even after dropping the anonymity axiom used by Skaperdas, their framework still implies that the technology of producing effective investments is the same for all contestants.
Mixed homogeneity
We now provide an axiomatization for the vector-parametric CSF's using the five axioms discussed in the previous section and the following mixed homogeneity axiom. 3 Clark and Riis (1998) combine the consistency and IIA S axioms of Skaperdas (1996) and propose
. However, IIACR is equivalent to consistency and IIA S only for those CSF's that imply a win probability of zero for a participating agent when his investment is zero. For example, the logit-CSF (p i (x) = [A6] Mixed Homogeneity.
This formulation says that the winning probabilities should remain unchanged if each agent's investment and inherent characteristics change by the same multiplicative factor. 5 The main result of the paper follows.
Theorem 2. The axioms A1 − A6 are satisfied if and only if
where h i (·) is any continuously differentiable polynomial-order
)] is any finite real number such that
Proof. In the Appendix.
7
The first thing to note is that homogeneity implies
In line with the interpretation of a production function, the total output of effective investment by an agent is a product of two terms. The first term is a function of the agent's inherent characteristics, and the second term is a function of the agent's investment per 5 Like Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998), we are unable to provide a genuine justification for the mixed homogeneity axiom. 6 A polynomial-order function is bounded from above by an O(x T ) function, for some finite T > 0. 7 It can be easily shown that (a) If the vector-parametric CSF satisfies homogeneity with respect to
. This is precisely the result obtained by Clark and Riis (1998). However, the resulting CSF is not continuous when all contestants invest zero. (b) If the CSF satisfies homogeneity with respect to inherent characteristics only, then fi(xi ; αi) = α r i · hi(xi). The class of CSF's satisfying A1 − A5 and homogeneity with respect inherent characteristics only is given by
, where h i (·) is continuously differentiable with h i (0) > 0, h i ≥ 0, ∀ i ∈ N , and r is any strictly positive real number.
unit of inherent characteristics. Moreover, homogeneity restricts g i (·), but not h i (·), to be same for all i ∈ N .
The detailed proof of Theorem 2 is provided in the appendix. We briefly discuss the significance of the involved restrictions. The effective investments by all agents must be strictly greater than zero when the actual investment by all agents are zero so that the winning probabilities are well defined. The axiom of marginal effects requires that the winning probability of a contestant should be non-decreasing in his own investment. The exponent r must be greater than a critical value r c for the winning probability of each contestant to be non-decreasing in his level of contest relevant inherent characteristics.
But, the CSF is well defined only if r c is finite. This is ensured if the h i 's are continuously differentiable polynomial-order functions with finite first order derivatives at zero. The critical value r c is the maximum value of the ratio of marginal effective investment to the average effective investment over all levels of actual investments across all contestants.
We present two examples that will help us distinguish the CSF's that belong to the parametric family axiomatized in this theorem, from those that do not.
t , where T is a finite integer, d i0 > 0, and d it is non-negative for all i ∈ N , for all t ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }.
This helps us show that
Therefore, the extreme value theorem implies that the maximum value of y i (z i ) for all z i ∈ + , for all i ∈ N , exists and is finite. Let us denote this maximum value of y i (z i ) by r c . The resulting CSF is
where r ≥ r c . Let us look at some particular cases.
(i) When T = 1, r c equals unity. If we take r = r c = 1 the above CSF reduces to
(ii) When d it is zero for all i ∈ N , for all t = (r + 1) ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T }, where T ≥ r + 1 ≥ r c then the above CSF reduces to
This is a continuous extension of the CSF axiomatized by Clark and Riis (1998).
Example 2. h i (
, for all i ∈ N .
Note that h i (z i ) is a continuously differentiable exponential-order
, and h i (0) = 1 is finite. However, the fact that the exponential function is an infinite series implies that
Hence, r c is infinite, which in turn implies that any function h i () which grows faster than polynomial-order functions can not be used to generate a CSF that belongs to the class of CSF's axiomatized in Theorem 2. In particular, the logit-CSF does not belong to this family.
Conditional Anonymity
We now introduce the (mixed) axiom of conditional anonymity which requires that two agents with same level of investment must have same winning probabilities if they have the same level of contest-relevant inherent characteristics. It formalizes the idea that the technology of producing effective investments is same across all the contestants even though they differ in their contest-relevant inherent characteristics.
[A7] Conditional Anonymity.
This axiom is meaningful only if each agent's technology for producing effective investments is determined by some factors common to all agents, but unrelated to their contest relevant inherent characteristics.
9 Conditional anonymity imposes the restriction
Thus, a CSF satisfies axioms A1 − A7 if and only if
With the additional axiom of conditional anonymity the example presented in equation (5) becomes
, for all i ∈ N . This is the exact CSF employed by Nti (2004) .
Scalar-parametric CSF's
In order to axiomatize the scalar-parametric CSF's we will assume that the winning probabilities depend on the vector of investments and a scalar parameter that is common to all agents. It is hard to justify that all contestants will share a common belief regarding the level of the scalar parameter unless the nature of the contest allows the contestants to do so. Therefore, we believe, scalar-parametric CSF's are especially suited for the analysis of contests mediated by an administrator. Following Kolmar and Wagener (2005) , we shall interpret the scalar parameter (noise) as a design variable in hands of the administrator. The administrator announces the value of this parameter before agents make their investments in order to induce different responses from different contestants.
We denote by A1 s the axiom A1 stated with α s ∈ ++ , instead of α ∈ N ++ . All axioms except the axiom of marginal effects and the axiom of anonymity remain unaltered in essence. In the previous section it was reasonable to assume that if the level of an agent's contest-relevant inherent characteristics (α i ) increases then his winning probability should not decrease. However, in this case, we find no reason to introduce an axiom regarding how changes in the value of the scalar parameter should affect the winning probabilities. The effect of of this parameter on will be a feature of the CSF resulting from the other axioms. Further, since this parameter is common to all agents, conditional anonymity collapses to anonymity. In this context anonymity reflects the idea that the contest administrator uses the same technology to convert the actual investments of agents into effective investments. Of course, the contest administrator can choose to discriminate among the contestants by assigning different technologies of producing effective investments to different contestants. 
where h(·) is any continuously differentiable function such that h(0) > 0, and h ≥ 0.
Proof. The proof is very similar to that of Theorem 2, and hence omitted.
It should again be noted that
As in the previous section, homogeneity implies g i (·) is the same for all i ∈ N , and anonymity implies h i (·) is the same for all i ∈ N . In addition, as the scalar parameter is common to all contestants, the term g(α s ) cancels out in the CSF.
Example 3. h(
We thus obtain
. One can interpret this CSF as follows. The administrator of a mediated contest invites agents to invest and explicitly announces that (i) an actual investment of x i will be treated as an effective investment of (α s + x i ), and (ii) the winning probability of each agent will be the ratio of his effective investment to the total effective investment.
By suitably choosing α s , the administrator can hope to manipulate the investments made by the agents if they have different costs of investing. It should also be noted that this CSF is precisely the noisy-CSF introduced by Amegashie (2006) . It can also be interpreted as a continuous extension of the Tullock-CSF. If we were to drop the axiom of continuity then all the CSF's that can be axiomatized using the framework of Skaperdas (1996) will belong to this scaler-parametric family axiomatized in Theorem 3.
Example 4. h( 
where θ = α −1 s is strictly positive. This is the logit-CSF axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996) .
Conclusion
We have provided the axiomatization of two parametric CSF's. In the first, the winning probability of each contestant depends on the investments made by all agents and a vector of parameters where each parameter captures the contest-relevant inherent characteristics of a contestant. Such CSF's are suitable for analyzing unmediated contests as level of inherent characteristics. However, this does not imply that all CSF's that belong to the single parameter family also belong to the family with a vector of parameters when all elements of this vector are the same. This is because while axiomatizing the scalar-parametric CSF we use the within version of the axiom of marginal effects. Note that, the logit-CSF belongs to the scalar-parametric family, but not the vector-parametric family.
in these contests each agent is likely to possess his own technology of producing effective investments. The second type of parametric CSF's axiomatized in this paper give the winning probability of each contestant as a function of the investments made by all contestants and a common scalar parameter. These CSF's can be used by administrators who plan to design a contest in order to achieve a particular objective by suitably choosing the parameter. Moreover, the results provided in this paper contain the existing axiomatizations by Skaperdas (1996) and Clark and Riis (1998) as special cases.
Since the last term in the above equality is the same for all i ∈ N , we can conclude that
